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DISARMING ABUSERS AND TRIGGERING THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT:  ARE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE MISDEMEANANTS GUARANTEED 
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL? 
Julia Hatheway* 
 
Domestic violence is a global issue, but in the United States it is especially 
lethal.  Hundreds of women are shot and killed in the United States by 
intimate partners every year.  Federal and state legislatures have enacted 
laws that focus on the issue of domestic violence and gun violence.  In 1996, 
Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
which permanently prohibits individuals convicted of domestic violence 
misdemeanors from possessing firearms.  Twenty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia have also enacted laws that mirror the Lautenberg 
Amendment.  In many jurisdictions, misdemeanor domestic violence 
convictions carry a maximum prison term of six months.  Such offenses are 
deemed “petty” and do not entitle the accused to the procedural right to a 
jury trial.  Following the enactment of domestic violence misdemeanor 
firearm prohibitions, misdemeanants have challenged their convictions.  
They have argued that the firearm prohibitions are so severe that they 
upgrade the offenses to serious offenses and require jury trials under the 
Sixth Amendment.  Most courts have found that the firearm prohibitions are 
not so severe that they guarantee the right to a jury trial.  However, a 
minority of courts have determined and some scholars argue that the firearm 
prohibitions are severe and therefore guarantee the right to a jury trial. 
This Note examines U.S. Supreme Court jury trial precedent and 
scholarship on collateral consequences to consider whether firearm 
prohibitions upgrade domestic violence misdemeanor offenses.  Focusing on 
Supreme Court precedent, legislative intent, and the movement to 
incorporate collateral consequences into criminal procedure, this Note 
argues that domestic violence misdemeanants, charged with presumptively 
petty offenses and subject to permanent firearm prohibitions, are not 
guaranteed the right to a jury trial. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Middlebury College.  
I would like thank Professor Tracy Higgins for her guidance during this process.  I would also 
like to thank Evelyn Michalos and the other members of the Fordham Law Review for their 
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In November 2001, Rocky Mosure murdered his wife, Michelle Monson 
Mosure, and their two young children.1  Michelle was twenty-three at the 
time, and her two children were six and seven years old.2  On the day of the 
murders, Rocky purchased a gun, returned to the family home, and killed his 
wife and children before shooting himself.3 
In early 2003, after years of abuse, Crystal Brame filed for divorce against 
her husband, Tacoma Police Chief David Brame.4  In April 2003, David 
murdered Crystal in front of the couple’s two children before shooting 
himself.5 
On Christmas Eve in 2016, seventeen-year-old Heather King went to break 
up with her twenty-two-year-old boyfriend, Matthew Wilson.6  Wilson shot 
and murdered Heather before killing himself.7 
These women’s stories are sadly not unique.  In the United States, 
hundreds of women are shot and killed by their intimate partners every year.8  
And each year, over ten million adults experience domestic violence or 
intimate partner violence (IPV).9  Domestic violence is commonly defined as 
a pattern of abusive behavior perpetrated against an intimate partner to 
maintain power and control over that individual.10  This behavior can include 
physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, and economic abuse, among 
 
 1. RACHEL LOUISE SNYDER, NO VISIBLE BRUISES:  WHAT WE DON’T KNOW ABOUT 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CAN KILL US 2–3 (2019). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. at 75–76. 
 4. Jerry Mitchell, Most Dangerous Time for Battered Women?:  When They Leave, 
CLARION-LEDGER (Jan. 28, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/ 
news/2017/01/28/most-dangerous-time-for-battered-women-is-when-they-leave-jerry-
mitchell/96955552/ [https://perma.cc/ZT4S-S23Y]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, GUNS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:  
AMERICA’S UNIQUELY LETHAL INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE PROBLEM 4 (2019), 
https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/10/IPV-for-WEB-042921A-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3NB-RXJW]. 
 9. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, NATIONAL STATISTICS DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 1 (2020), https://assets.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence-
2020080709350855.pdf?1596828650457 [https://perma.cc/7GC2-QUET].  Although the 
terms “IPV” and “domestic violence” are often used interchangeably, domestic violence often 
refers broadly to all violence between family members or violence that takes place in the home, 
while IPV refers to violence between intimate partners. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra 
note 8, at 6.  For consistency, this Note uses the term “domestic violence” throughout. 
 10. Id. 
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other forms of abuse.11  It is estimated that one in four women and one in ten 
men have been abused by an intimate partner in the United States.12 
The presence of guns in domestic violence situations often has lethal 
results.  The risk of domestic violence homicide increases by 400 percent 
when the abuser has access to a gun.13  On average, abusers shoot and kill 
fifty-seven women in the United States each month.14  Almost one million 
women have been shot or shot at by an intimate partner.15  And this number 
is increasing.  Between 2008 and 2017, the number of female domestic 
violence homicides increased by 15 percent.16  Women of color, including 
Black, Native American, and Hispanic women, are more likely to be shot at 
or killed by an intimate partner than white women.17 
Access to guns coupled with domestic violence not only leads to the 
murder of intimate partners but also is closely connected to mass shootings.  
More than 50 percent of the individuals who carried out mass shootings in 
the last ten years killed an intimate partner or family member.18  Thus, 
prohibiting abusers’ access to guns is important to protect victims of 
domestic violence and to reduce gun violence. 
However, because the right to keep and bear arms is enshrined in the 
Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,19 firearm prohibitions, which 
infringe a constitutionally protected right, are a contentious issue and are 
frequently challenged in court.20  One challenge that has emerged before a 
few state and federal courts is based on the argument that permanent firearm 
prohibitions that result from misdemeanor criminal convictions are so serious 
a penalty that the accused must be guaranteed the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial.21 
This Note analyzes the argument that the government cannot restrict an 
individual’s Second Amendment right, while simultaneously denying the 
individual’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Specifically, this Note 
considers the issue of whether a penalty restricting an individual’s Second 
Amendment right, stemming from a misdemeanor conviction, triggers the 
 
 11. See id.  Not all acts of domestic abuse are illegal and thus are not criminally 
prosecuted. Edna Erez, Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System:  An Overview, 
ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING, Jan. 2002, https://ojin.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ 
ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume72002/No1Jan2002/Dom
esticViolenceandCriminalJustice.aspx [https://perma.cc/X4X2-C3XV]. 
 12. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 9, at 1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4.  While domestic violence affects 
men, women, children, nonbinary, and gender nonconforming individuals, and can be 
perpetrated by anyone, domestic violence is overwhelmingly perpetrated by men against 
women. See NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 9, at 1. 
 15. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4. 
 16. Id. at 9. 
 17. Id. at 16–17. 
 18. Id. at 5. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 20. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 21. See infra Parts II.A.1–2, II.B.1–2. 
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individual’s Sixth Amendment jury trial right as it pertains to domestic 
violence misdemeanors. 
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides relevant background 
information regarding Sixth Amendment and Second Amendment 
jurisprudence and the history of federal and state legislation that seeks to 
prohibit domestic abusers’ access to firearms.  Part II examines two opposing 
perspectives on whether permanent firearm prohibitions that apply as a result 
of a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction are such serious penalties 
that they upgrade a presumptively petty offense to a serious offense and 
trigger the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.  Part III argues 
that a court presented with this question should find, based on Sixth 
Amendment precedent, that a firearm prohibition stemming from a 
misdemeanor domestic violence conviction does not trigger the accused’s 
jury trial right.  Part III also recommends that Congress, state legislatures, 
and domestic violence advocates focus on enforcing firearm prohibitions and 
enhancing civil protection orders that prohibit abusers from possessing 
firearms to enhance domestic violence victims’ safety. 
I.  THE SIXTH AND SECOND AMENDMENTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
FIREARM PROHIBITIONS 
Part I presents relevant Sixth and Second Amendment jurisprudence and 
details the enactment and scope of federal and state legislation intended to 
restrict domestic abusers’ access to firearms.  Part I.A discusses the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically the cases that 
established and refined the applicable test to determine when a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment jury trial right is triggered by noncarceral penalties.  Part 
I.B reviews the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, including two of 
the Court’s decisions that expanded the interpretation of the right to bear 
arms, and discusses lower courts’ applications of different levels of scrutiny 
to Second Amendment challenges.  Part I.C introduces federal and state 
legislation that restrict abusers’ access to firearms. 
A.  The Sixth Amendment:  The Right to a Jury Trial for Serious Offenses 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial22 in criminal cases provides a 
check on the government’s power to criminally prosecute individuals.23  The 
jury trial right acts as a “safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”24  
However, early Supreme Court precedent established that, despite the text of 
the Sixth Amendment providing the right to an impartial jury in all criminal 
prosecutions, not all criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a jury 
 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”). 
 23. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 24. Id.  While the Sixth Amendment lists multiple rights afforded to an individual facing 
a criminal prosecution, this Note focuses only on the right to a jury trial. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. 
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trial.25  The rationale for restricting this procedural protection to certain 
offenses rests on the notion that in less serious cases, the accused benefits 
from an expeditious and inexpensive adjudication, which also lends greater 
efficiency to the court system.26 
The Supreme Court has long distinguished between petty and serious 
offenses, finding that only the latter trigger the accused’s right to a jury 
trial.27  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court relied on 
precedent established at English common law and at the time the Constitution 
was drafted to distinguish petty from serious offenses.28  The Court focused 
on the nature of the offense, the penalty imposed, and the treatment of similar 
penalties and offenses at common law to determine whether an offense was 
petty or serious.29  In the second half of the twentieth century, the Court 
began to expound a test to distinguish petty from serious offenses. 
1.  Distinguishing Petty Offenses from Serious Offenses 
In Duncan v. Louisiana,30 the Supreme Court held that the right to a jury 
trial in criminal prosecutions is fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice and was incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.31  The Court emphasized the history of the jury trial right and 
precedent at common law, as well as its establishment in both Article III and 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.32  The Court held that the jury trial 
right for “serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing 
miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all 
defendants.”33  However, the Court cautioned that the jury trial right did not 
extend to all crimes.34 
Turning to the issue of petty offenses, the Court reaffirmed its previous 
decisions35 and recognized that there were offenses to which the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial did not extend.36  While recognizing the 
important role of the jury trial to protect the accused from injustice, the Court 
also noted that, in some situations, an efficient and inexpensive nonjury 
 
 25. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624–27 (1937); Schick v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 65, 69–70 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888). 
 26. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158–60. 
 27. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1989); Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157–58; Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624–27; 
Schick, 195 U.S. at 69–70; Callan, 127 U.S. at 555. 
 28. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625–26; Schick, 195 U.S. at 69–70; Callan, 127 U.S. at 557. 
 29. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 623–25; Schick, 195 U.S. at 67–68; Callan, 127 U.S. at 556. 
 30. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 31. Id. at 149. 
 32. Id. at 151–57. 
 33. Id. at 158. 
 34. Id. (“[W]e hold no constitutional doubts about the practices . . . of . . . prosecuting 
petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial”). 
 35. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1989); Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157–58; District of Columbia v. Clawans, 
300 U.S. 617, 624–27 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69–70 (1904); Callan v. 
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888). 
 36. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159. 
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adjudication outweighed this concern.37  The Court suggested it need not 
establish an absolute rule demarcating petty from serious offenses; however, 
it nevertheless suggested that the appropriate line was a potential prison term 
falling somewhere between six months and one year.38  In doing so, the Court 
held that the potential maximum authorized penalty, not the penalty actually 
imposed, was the relevant criteria to distinguish petty from serious 
offenses.39  The Court also focused on the legislature’s intent, stating that 
“[t]he penalty authorized by the law of the locality” reflected the legislature’s 
perception of the offense in question.40 
Two years after Duncan, the Court decided Baldwin v. New York,41 where 
it explicitly established the line distinguishing petty from serious offenses.42  
The Court held that a potential prison sentence of more than six months 
signaled that the offense was serious and triggered the accused’s Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right.43  In doing so, the Court held that New York 
could not deny misdemeanants the right to a jury trial when they faced a 
potential prison term of six months to one year.44 
In its analysis, the Court held that the severity of the maximum potential 
penalty for an offense was the most pertinent factor to consider when 
distinguishing petty from serious offenses.45  The Court reasoned that the 
six-month line was consistent with federal procedure, the system in place at 
the time the Constitution was drafted, and the practices of the majority of 
states.46  The Court further explained that the significant protections afforded 
by a jury trial, especially the prevention of government oppression, became 
particularly significant when individuals could be deprived of their liberty 
for more than six months.47  While the Court recognized that establishing a 
strict dividing point was to some degree arbitrary, it nevertheless held that 
six months appropriately reflected a balancing point between the degree of 
restriction on individual liberty requiring greater protection against 
government oppression and the benefits of a speedy, efficient, and 
inexpensive nonjury adjudication.48  The following section introduces the 
Court’s jury trial analysis as it applies to noncarceral penalties. 
 
 37. Id. at 158–60. 
 38. Id. at 159–61.  The Court recognized that the federal system drew this line at six 
months, which was consistent with practices in the eighteenth century, and that forty-nine 
states drew the line at one year. Id. at 161. 
 39. Id. at 159–60. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
 42. Id. at 69. 
 43. Id. (“[W]e have concluded that no offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the 
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”). 
 44. Id. at 69–74. 
 45. Id. at 68. 
 46. Id. at 71–72. 
 47. Id. at 72. 
 48. Id. at 73–74. 
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2.  Presumptively Petty Offenses and Noncarceral Penalties 
In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas,49 the Supreme Court held that an 
offense with a maximum prison term of six months was presumptively petty 
and that additional penalties attached to a conviction could enhance the 
offense to become a serious offense if the additional penalties clearly 
demonstrated that such was the intent of the legislature.50  The Court clarified 
that “penalty” referred to the maximum period of incarceration, as well as to 
fines, license suspensions, or community service requirements.51 
In Blanton, Melvin R. Blanton and Mark D. Fraley were separately 
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.52  Both Blanton and 
Fraley requested jury trials, which the municipal court denied.53  On appeal, 
the district court denied Blanton’s jury trial request but granted Fraley’s.54  
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada, Blanton argued that the 
additional penalties imposed entitled him to a jury trial.55  The Supreme 
Court of Nevada determined that even with the additional penalties—namely 
community service as an alternative to a maximum six-month prison term, a 
ninety day driver’s license suspension, a $1000 fine, and a required alcohol 
abuse course—the accused were not guaranteed the right to a jury trial under 
the Sixth Amendment.56  The Supreme Court agreed.57 
The Court identified that the most relevant measure to determine whether 
an offense was serious or petty was the maximum potential penalty, 
specifically the maximum potential prison term the accused might face.58  
The Court explained that the measure provided an objective reflection of the 
legislature’s determination that an offense is petty or serious.59 
The Court further recognized that other potential penalties imposed by the 
legislature demonstrated the perceived pettiness or seriousness of the 
offense.60  However, it reaffirmed that the maximum period of incarceration 
remained the most important measure.61  The Court reasoned that the severity 
of the loss of liberty that resulted from a prison term longer than six months 
was uniquely different from other penalties that restricted individual 
freedoms.62  Thus, an additional statutory penalty likely would only upgrade 
a presumptively petty offense to the level of a serious one if it was “so severe” 
to unquestionably demonstrate the legislature’s intent that the offense was 
 
 49. 489 U.S. 538 (1989). 
 50. Id. at 543. 
 51. Id. at 542. 
 52. Id. at 540. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 540–42. 
 56. Id. at 539–40. 
 57. Id. at 543. 
 58. Id. at 541. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 542. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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serious.63  The Court also noted that while many penalties infringe on an 
individual’s rights, this infringement is not comparable to the loss of liberty 
that results from an extended prison sentence.64  The Court acknowledged 
that this standard was ambiguous but held that the penalties imposed on a 
DUI (driving under the influence) misdemeanant in Nevada did not 
demonstrate that the legislature intended to elevate the offense to a serious 
offense.65 
After Blanton, the Court has never held that a noncarceral penalty 
upgrades a petty offense to a serious offense triggering the right to a jury 
trial.66  The Court has found that a defendant, charged with multiple petty 
offenses, is not guaranteed the right to a jury trial.67  It has also held that a 
$5000 fine and a five-year probation term as a prison alternative do not 
upgrade a presumptively petty offense.68  In that decision, the Court 
recognized that additional penalties, including fines and probation terms, do 
not “approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.”69 
3.  Collateral Consequences and the Sixth Amendment 
The Court’s decision in Blanton presented a framework for how courts 
should assess collateral consequences, or noncarceral penalties, when 
addressing the severity of the offense at issue and the right to a jury trial.  
Collateral consequences are penalties or restrictions imposed on criminal 
defendants, such as license restrictions, firearm prohibitions, sex offender 
registration, public benefit eligibility, and deportation for noncitizens.70  
Thousands of state and federal laws and regulations affect ex-offenders by 
creating collateral consequences.71  These consequences are often justified 
and promoted as regulations intended to increase public safety.72 
Collateral consequences are distinguished from “direct” penalties, 
specifically incarceration, because the former are labeled as civil penalties 
and traditionally are not considered in the sentencing of defendants.73  This 
distinction has been widely accepted and adopted into criminal procedure.74  
The collateral consequences rule established the requirement that defense 
 
 63. Id. at 543. 
 64. Id. at 542. 
 65. Id. at 543–44. 
 66. Kansas v. Woolverton, 371 P.3d 941, 944 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). 
 67. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327 (1996). 
 68. United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1993). 
 69. Id. at 5 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542). 
 70. Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice:  Future Policy and 
Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 233, 240–42 (2018). 
 71. See John G. Malcolm, The Problem with the Proliferation of Collateral 
Consequences, FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Jan. 2018, at 36, 37. 
 72. Joshua Kaiser, We Know It When We See It:  The Tenuous Line Between “Direct 
Punishment” and “Collateral Consequences,” 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 370 (2016). 
 73. Malcolm, supra note 71, at 37. 
 74. See Kaiser, supra note 72, at 359–60. 
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counsel need only inform a criminal defendant of direct consequences 
resulting from a conviction or plea, not collateral consequences.75 
Many scholars argue that the distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences is misguided and incoherent.76  Critics argue that collateral 
consequences are not only ineffective but also are often as, if not more, 
burdensome and punitive than the direct consequences criminal defendants 
face.77  These penalties can last longer than a prison term and can be 
permanent.78  As such, critics have argued that criminal procedure should no 
longer ignore noncarceral penalties.79 
One of the Court’s decisions may demonstrate a trend toward 
incorporating such consequences into criminal procedure and eliminating the 
distinction between collateral and direct consequences.80  In Padilla v. 
Kentucky,81 the Supreme Court held that constitutionally competent counsel 
was required to advise a client if a conviction by guilty plea could result in 
deportation.82  The Court also recognized that the direct-collateral dichotomy 
was not applicable to deportation, given its close relationship with the 
criminal process.83  This decision, which requires deportation to be addressed 
in criminal procedure, moves away from the direct-collateral distinction and 
contradicts the collateral consequences rule.84 
While the Court has not recently considered whether criminal defendants 
have the right to a jury trial in prosecutions where a conviction will result in 
the defendant’s deportation, lower courts have considered this issue.85  In 
Bado v. United States,86 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a 
jury trial to a defendant charged with a deportable offense, regardless of the 
maximum authorized prison term.87  The court reasoned that the consequence 
of deportation was sufficiently severe that it transformed a presumptively 
petty offense into a serious offense, triggering the accused’s Sixth 
 
 75. Id. at 359. 
 76. Chin, supra note 70, at 258; Paul T. Crane, Incorporating Collateral Consequences 
into Criminal Procedure, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 21 (2019); Kaiser, supra note 72, at 
343; Malcolm, supra note 71, at 36–37. 
 77. Kaiser, supra note 72, at 343–46; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 
(2010) (“[D]eportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”). 
 78. See Kaiser, supra note 72, at 342–44. 
 79. See Crane, supra note 76, at 21–22. 
 80. Kaiser, supra note 72, at 344. 
 81. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 82. Id. at 359–60. 
 83. Id. at 365. 
 84. Crane, supra note 76, at 25. 
 85. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S 279, 290 (1904) (stating that 
“the provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury have no application” to 
deportations). 
 86. 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018).  For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Emily 
Ahdieh, Comment, The Deportation Trigger:  Collateral Consequences and the 
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial, 30 GEO. MASON C.R.L.J. 65 (2019). 
 87. Bado, 186 A.3d at 1260. 
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Amendment jury trial right.88  The court found that deportation was a severe 
penalty, in some cases having more damaging effects than incarceration.89  
In People v. Suazo,90 the New York Court of Appeals came to the same 
conclusion as the court in Bado.91  The court determined that defendants 
facing deportation as a result of conviction must be guaranteed a jury trial 
under the Sixth Amendment.92 
Part I.A focused on the Court’s jurisprudence and analysis of one 
procedural right under the Sixth Amendment.  Part I.B discusses the 
substantive right guaranteed by the Second Amendment. 
B.  The Second Amendment:  An Individual and Fundamental Right to Bear 
Arms 
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “[a] well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”93  Shortly after the 
Constitution was ratified in 1787, Congress passed the Second Amendment 
to protect the rights of individuals to keep militias in their respective states.94  
The need to protect this right stemmed from the desire to protect state 
sovereignty and to defend against the formation of an overly powerful federal 
government.95  In the nineteenth century, the Court interpreted the Second 
Amendment to restrict only the powers of the federal government, not the 
powers of the states.96 
The Court’s early Second Amendment jurisprudence also interpreted the 
Second Amendment in relation to the preservation of a militia.  In 1939, the 
Court decided United States v. Miller,97 where it held that the Second 
Amendment did not protect an individual’s right to possess a firearm, which 
had no “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia.”98  Miller dealt with a Second Amendment challenge to a 
provision of the National Firearms Act,99 which restricted the interstate 
transportation of an unregistered shotgun with a barrel length measuring less 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1251. 
 90. 118 N.E.3d 168 (N.Y. 2018). 
 91. Id. at 171. 
 92. Id.  But see generally Amezcua v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 319 P.3d 602 (Nev. 2014) 
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 93. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 94. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (holding that the Second 
Amendment restricts only the powers of the federal government, not the powers of state 
governments); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264 (1886) (same); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (same). 
 97. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 98. Id. at 178. 
 99. National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934) (repealed 1976). 
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than eighteen inches.100  The Court held that the statute did not violate the 
Second Amendment because the firearm in question was not related to the 
preservation of the militia.101  In doing so, the Court focused on the Second 
Amendment’s relationship to Article I of the Constitution, which affords 
Congress the power to assemble a militia, comprised of the militias of each 
state, in order to protect the safety and security of the nation and to enforce 
its laws.102  It explained that the states ratified the Second Amendment to 
ensure such power could be executed.103  Following its decision in Miller in 
1939, the Court did not decide another Second Amendment case until 2008. 
1.  Heller and McDonald Individualize and Incorporate the Second 
Amendment 
In 2008, the Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller.104  In Heller, 
the Court held that the Second Amendment was not limited to the right to 
bear arms in relation to military service but was an individual right to keep 
and bear arms.105  The Court struck down two laws passed by the District of 
Columbia.106  The first required individuals to apply for and receive a license 
to keep a handgun in their home, and the second required firearm owners to 
store their guns either in a disassembled fashion or bound by a trigger lock.107  
The Court found that banning handguns, “the most preferred firearm in the 
nation,”108 or requiring firearms to be inoperable while stored109 denied 
Americans the right to self-defense in the home, which the Court held was 
critical to the Second Amendment right.110 
The Heller decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, focused on 
whether the Amendment’s prefatory clause, “[a] well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State”111 restricts the operative clause, “the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”112  If the 
prefatory clause does restrict the operative clause, the right to carry a firearm 
would exist only in connection to military service.113  Alternatively, if it does 
not restrict the operative clause, the prefatory clause simply states the 
Amendment’s purpose.114  The Court held the latter, that the prefatory clause 
 
 100. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 105. Id. at 601–02. 
 106. Id. at 635. 
 107. Id. at 628–30. 
 108. Id. at 628. 
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 110. Id. at 628–29. 
 111. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 112. Id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–600. 
 113. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. 
 114. Id. 
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clarified the purpose of the amendment—to preserve the existence of a 
militia115—but did not influence the scope of the operative clause.116 
The Court’s decision focused on the amendment’s text.  Beginning with 
the operative clause, the Court noted that “the people” referred to all 
members of the political community117 and that “keep and bear Arms” 
referred to possessing or carrying firearms for confrontation, specifically for 
self-defense,118 regardless of their use for military purposes or the 
individual’s military status.119  Turning to the prefatory clause, the Court held 
that the “Militia” referred to all able-bodied men, that “well-regulated” meant 
effectively trained, and that “security of a free State” referred to a safe and 
free country.120 
Finding that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to bear 
arms, the Court was careful to recognize its limits.121  The Court 
acknowledged that legislation regulating commercial gun sales, prohibiting 
the possession of firearms by certain groups, including felons and people 
with mental infirmities, and restricting the possession of firearms in specific 
spaces, such as schools and government buildings, remained presumptively 
lawful.122 
The Court revisited its prior decisions and found that none precluded an 
individual right analysis.123  The Court found that its previous decisions 
reflected an interpretation of the right to bear arms that was broader than just 
the right in connection to service in a militia,124 neglected to interrogate the 
amendment’s scope,125 or dealt with laws that restricted firearms which fell 
outside the amendment’s scope, and thus did not limit the right to military 
use.126  Thus, the Court determined that its holding was consistent with 
Second Amendment precedent.127 
Two years after Heller, the Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago,128 
where it held that the Second Amendment was a fundamental right and thus 
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.129  The ordinances at issue in McDonald required all 
individuals to have a valid registration to own a firearm and prohibited the 
registration of most handguns.130  The petitioners argued that these 
ordinances prohibited them from possessing handguns in their homes for 
self-defense.131 
The Court sought to determine whether the Second Amendment was 
incorporated against the states under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.132  Relying on Heller, the Court found that the 
individual right to keep and bear arms, particularly for self-defense in the 
home, is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”133  Thus, the 
Court held that the Second Amendment was binding on the states as a 
fundamental right and Bill of Rights guarantee.134  Following the Court’s 
decisions in Heller and McDonald, lower courts have sought to apply the 
Court’s decisions to Second Amendment challenges. 
2.  Standards of Review Applied to Second Amendment Challenges 
The Supreme Court did not identify in Heller or McDonald the level of 
scrutiny that should be applied to Second Amendment challenges.135  This 
section presents lower courts’ interpretations of this silence and their 
applications of intermediate or strict scrutiny to Second Amendment 
challenges. 
In reviewing constitutional challenges, the Court tends to apply one of 
three standards of review:  rational basis review,136 intermediate scrutiny,137 
or strict scrutiny.138  Rational basis review is the most deferential and least 
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No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Second Amendment’s ratification and found that the right was deeply rooted in the tradition 
and history of the United States. See id. at 768–80. 
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(applying rational basis review); Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 
291 (1984) (same); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983) (same); Ohio Bureau 
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 138. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (applying strict 
scrutiny); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (same); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (same); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (same); Att’y Gen. of New York v. 
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 (1986) (same). 
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exacting standard.139  Rational basis review requires that the government 
have a legitimate interest and that the challenged law be rationally related to 
that interest.140  Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government have an 
important interest and that the challenged law be substantially related to that 
interest.141  Strict scrutiny is the most stringent of the three standards.142  The 
test applied under strict scrutiny requires that a statute be narrowly tailored 
to advance a compelling state interest.143 
As the Supreme Court has not identified the applicable standard of review 
for Second Amendment challenges, lower courts have endeavored to 
determine which standard is appropriate.144  When considering Second 
Amendment challenges to federal law that prohibits domestic violence 
misdemeanants from possessing a firearm,145 a number of lower courts have 
applied intermediate scrutiny.146  Other courts have analyzed domestic 
violence firearm prohibition challenges using strict scrutiny.147 
To determine whether a law violates the Second Amendment, many courts 
have employed the two-step test first expounded in United States v. 
Marzzarella.148  The first step determines whether the conduct that is 
restricted by the law is within the Second Amendment’s scope.149  If not, the 
inquiry ends and the challenge fails.150  Alternatively, if the law imposes a 
burden on conduct that falls within the amendment’s scope, courts employ 
either intermediate or strict scrutiny to evaluate the law.151  Whether the law 
passes under one of these tests determines if it is constitutional.152  Because 
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the Supreme Court has not prescribed a standard of review for gun laws, the 
Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence has resulted in uncertainty.153  
The next section focuses on federal and state legislation that was enacted to 
reduce gun violence perpetrated by domestic abusers. 
C.  Domestic Violence Firearm Prohibitions 
Over the past twenty-five years, Congress and state legislatures have 
passed laws aimed at prohibiting domestic abusers from possessing firearms.  
One challenge that implicates these laws argues that where individuals are 
denied their Second Amendment right due to firearm prohibitions that result 
from domestic violence misdemeanor convictions, those individuals must be 
guaranteed the right to a jury trial.  This challenge emerged after laws were 
enacted at the federal and state levels to prohibit domestic violence 
misdemeanants from possessing guns.  This section discusses these federal 
and state laws. 
1.  The Lautenberg Amendment 
In 1968, Congress passed the Gun Control Act,154 which provided federal 
oversight and control of the interstate commerce of firearms to support 
anti-crime efforts of law enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels.155  
The provisions passed in 1968 made it unlawful for unlicensed firearm 
manufacturers, importers, and dealers to sell or transport firearms or 
ammunition in interstate commerce.156  The 1968 provisions also made it 
unlawful for anyone convicted of a felony or deemed mentally infirm to 
possess a gun.157 
In 1994, Congress added § 922(g)(8) to the Gun Control Act, prohibiting 
the possession of a firearm or ammunition by an individual subject to a court 
order—commonly termed a restraining order, protective order, or order of 
protection—that prohibits the individual from “harassing, stalking, or 
threatening an intimate partner of such person.”158  An order of protection is 
often issued by a civil court after the petitioning party has demonstrated that 
there has been an incident of domestic violence.159  A protective order 
instructs the perpetrating party to cease contact with the petitioner and to 
refrain from harassing or threatening them.160  Section 922(g)(8) requires a 
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showing that the parties have an intimate partner relationship and that the 
responding party presents a threat to the safety of the petitioning party or the 
petitioning party’s child.161  The text mandates that the responding party 
must be afforded a hearing and notice.162  A responding party that violates 
this provision can be prosecuted and sentenced to a prison term of up to ten 
years.163 
In 1996, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment164 to the Gun 
Control Act of 1968.165  The Lautenberg Amendment prohibits individuals 
convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors under state or federal law from 
owning or possessing firearms.166  Therefore, if an individual is convicted of 
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and is later found in possession 
of a firearm, that individual can be federally prosecuted under § 922(g)(9) 
and sentenced to a prison term of up to ten years.167  The statute requires that 
the elements of the underlying misdemeanor conviction include use or 
attempted use of physical force and that the relationship between the 
perpetrator and the victim fit one of the following categories:  current or 
former spouses, parents, guardians, persons who share a child in common, or 
persons who currently or previously lived together in a spousal, parental, 
guardian, or similar relationship.168 
Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to “close th[e] dangerous 
loophole,” whereby violent domestic abusers, who were charged with or pled 
guilty to misdemeanors, were not prohibited from possessing firearms.169  
Domestic abusers may be charged with or plead guilty to misdemeanors for 
multiple reasons.170  Domestic abuse often occurs in private, and therefore 
such cases often lack witnesses, corroboration, or physical evidence.171  
Often police officers responding to domestic abuse are not equipped to deal 
with such incidents or do not take victims seriously.172  Further, victims who 
have been in abusive relationships may also suffer from battered women’s 
syndrome, which, like post-traumatic stress disorder, can affect an 
individual’s cognitive functions and precipitate coping mechanisms, such as 
denial, minimization, and repression, which make it more difficult for a 
victim to testify effectively.173  Lastly, victims face other factors that may 
inhibit their desire or ability to participate in a prosecution, including a 
victim’s relationship with the abuser, financial dependence on the abuser, 
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children in common with the abuser, or societal pressures that reinforce the 
notion that domestic violence is a private matter.174 
On multiple occasions the Supreme Court has clarified the applicability 
and scope of § 922(g)(9).175  Lower courts have also upheld the relevant 
section as constitutional, finding it does not violate the Second 
Amendment.176 
2.  State Laws 
Following the enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment, twenty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that restrict domestic 
abusers’ access to firearms.177  Some state laws that restrict domestic 
violence misdemeanants’ access to firearms are more expansive than the 
federal law.  For example, some states define the relationship between the 
abuser and the victim more broadly and may include dating partners or family 
members, while other states restrict access to firearms for anyone convicted 
of any violent misdemeanor.178  Sixteen states require convicted domestic 
violence misdemeanants to relinquish any firearms they possess.179 
Forty-three states have enacted laws that prohibit individuals subject to 
domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms after notice 
and a hearing.180  Some of these state laws are more restrictive than the 
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federal law and require that specific circumstances be met before including a 
firearm prohibition in the order.181 
Twenty-one states prohibit individuals subject to an ex parte restraining 
order from possessing firearms.182  Ex parte orders are granted almost 
immediately after an individual petitions the court for a protective order, 
before a hearing and notice.183  The temporary order remains in place until a 
hearing or trial takes place, following notice to the respondent, at which point 
the court decides whether to issue a final order of protection.184  The 
following section discusses the effects of these laws. 
3.  Domestic Violence Gun Laws and Victim Safety 
Statistics suggest that laws restricting domestic abusers’ access to firearms 
increase victims’ safety.185  States that restrict access to firearms by 
individuals subject to domestic violence protection orders reported a 
reduction of domestic violence firearm homicides by 13 percent.186  States 
that require or encourage those who are subject to domestic violence 
protection orders to relinquish guns and ammunition have reported a 
reduction in domestic violence firearm homicides of 14 to 16 percent.187  
Moreover, between 1998 and 2019, federal background checks blocked the 
sale of almost 400,000 firearms to domestic abusers, either misdemeanants 
or individuals subject to protective orders.188 
While many state and federal legislatures have enacted laws aimed at 
reducing domestic violence gun violence, these laws have been challenged, 
in some cases successfully, in both federal and state courts.189  Successful 
procedural challenges, which argue that domestic violence misdemeanants 
subject to § 922(g)(9) or comparable state laws are entitled to a jury trial 
because of the severity of such a penalty, could result in fewer prosecutions 
of domestic abusers under offenses that trigger firearm prohibitions.190  This 
could result in fewer victims receiving the protection such laws were enacted 
to provide.  Part II presents opposing arguments to these challenges. 
 
 181. Id.; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100(c)(7) (West 2021) (requiring “the 
respondent to surrender any firearm owned or possessed by the respondent if the court finds 
that the respondent was in the actual possession of or used a firearm during the commission 
of the domestic violence”). 
 182. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 22 n.75. 
 183. See Sarah Martin, Evidence-Based, Constitutionally-Sound Approaches to Reducing 
Gun Violence, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 245, 267 (2018); see also Restraining Order, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 184. See Domestic Violence & Firearms, supra note 178. 
 185. See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 22. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 25.  This only covers sales by licensed dealers.  Domestic abusers can still 
illegally purchase firearms privately and at gun shows. Id. 
 189. See infra Part II. 
 190. See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
198 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
II.  DO FIREARM PROHIBITIONS TRIGGER MISDEMEANANTS’ JURY TRIAL 
RIGHT? 
In Blanton, the Supreme Court set forth its Sixth Amendment jury trial 
analysis to determine whether a noncarceral consequence upgrades a 
presumptively petty offense—an offense with a maximum prison term of six 
months—to a serious offense, triggering the accused’s jury trial right.191  
This part discusses the conflict that has emerged as courts apply the Blanton 
analysis to determine whether misdemeanants, who face restrictions to their 
Second Amendment rights, are entitled to a jury trial. 
Part II.A presents the argument that those subject to restrictions of their 
Second Amendment rights, due to domestic violence misdemeanor 
convictions, must be guaranteed the right to a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 present case law from a federal district 
court and one state supreme court that determined that domestic violence 
misdemeanants are guaranteed the right to a jury trial due to the severity of 
applicable firearm prohibitions.  Part II.A.3 introduces scholarly analysis that 
incorporates collateral consequences into criminal procedure and argues that 
domestic violence misdemeanants are guaranteed the right to a jury trial.  Part 
II.B discusses the argument that domestic violence misdemeanants, who are 
prohibited from possessing firearms, are not guaranteed the right to a jury 
trial.  Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 present relevant case law from federal and state 
courts.  Part II.B.3 introduces the work of Professor Sandra Mayson, who 
advocates for keeping collateral consequences distinct from direct 
consequences. 
A.  Firearm Prohibitions Are Serious and Guarantee Misdemeanants the 
Right to a Jury Trial 
Most state and federal courts that have expressly addressed whether a 
domestic violence misdemeanant is afforded the right to a jury trial have 
found that a restriction on an accused’s Second Amendment right, as a result 
of a misdemeanor conviction, does not trigger the right to a jury trial under 
the Sixth Amendment.192  However, in United States v. Smith193 and 
Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court,194 both an Oklahoma federal 
district court and the Nevada Supreme Court found that firearm prohibitions 
resulting from misdemeanor convictions do upgrade the offense and trigger 
the accused’s jury trial right.195 
1.  Smith:  The Lautenberg Amendment Imposes a Serious Punishment 
In United States v. Smith, the accused, who was charged with misdemeanor 
assault of his ex-wife, faced a maximum prison term of six months and was 
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subject to § 922(g)(9).196  Smith requested a jury trial, which the court 
granted.197  The district court found that the permanent firearm prohibition 
was a serious punishment, demonstrating the seriousness of the offense and 
thus guaranteed Smith the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.198  
The court’s reasoning was threefold.  First, it found that firearm prohibitions 
are serious because of the important role guns play in American life—for 
self-defense, in leisure activities, and in the military.199  Second, the court 
stated that gun restrictions reflect serious penalties given the divisiveness and 
urgency of such restrictions in public discourse.200  And third, it asserted that 
the severity of the penalty for violating § 922(g)(9), and the fact that the 
neighboring provisions of § 922(g) applied to dangerous individuals, 
including convicted felons, reflected the seriousness of the provision.201 
The court recognized that its holding diverged from the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Chavez,202 but it determined that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s analysis was misplaced.203  The court reasoned that the appropriate 
analysis looked at the severity of the penalty imposed by Congress, not at 
whether Congress was aware that domestic violence misdemeanants, subject 
to the firearm prohibition, may not have the right to a jury trial in underlying 
proceedings.204 
2.  Andersen:  The Nevada Legislature Determined Domestic Battery Is a 
Serious Offense 
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Nevada in Andersen v. Eighth Judicial 
District Court held that because the legislature had specifically added a 
penalty prohibiting individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence 
battery from possessing firearms, “the Legislature ha[d] determined that the 
offense [was] a serious one.”205  The court therefore found that the accused 
was guaranteed the right to a jury trial.206 
In Andersen, Christopher Andersen was charged with domestic battery and 
simple battery.207  Andersen demanded a jury trial, which the municipal court 
denied on the basis of the misdemeanor offense having a maximum prison 
sentence of six months, which was presumptively petty.208  Andersen entered 
a no contest plea to the domestic battery charge, and the court dismissed the 
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simple battery charge.209  On appeal, Andersen argued that the additional 
penalties, specifically the firearm prohibition, signified that the legislature 
had determined the offense was serious, triggering his Sixth Amendment jury 
trial right.210  The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed.211  The court, citing 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent,212 stated that the maximum penalty imposed 
by the legislature provided the appropriate framework to determine whether 
the legislature deemed the offense to be serious.213  Specifically, the court 
found that because the Nevada legislature had added a provision that 
restricted the right to possess a firearm “that automatically and directly flows 
from a conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery . . . . this new 
penalty . . . ‘clearly reflect[s] a legislative determination that the offense [of 
misdemeanor domestic battery] is a serious one.’”214 
The Supreme Court of Nevada clarified and differentiated the Andersen 
holding from its 2014 decision in Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial District 
Court.215  In Amezcua, the court held that misdemeanor domestic battery was 
not a serious offense such that the accused must be guaranteed the right to a 
jury trial.216  The court held that the additional penalties, including the 
permanent federal firearm prohibition, did not reflect the Nevada 
legislature’s determination that the offense was so serious as to implicate the 
right to a jury trial.217  At the time the court decided Amezcua, there was no 
Nevada state law restricting a domestic violence misdemeanant’s access to 
firearms.218  Instead, Amezcua dealt with the federal law, § 922(g)(9).219  The 
court determined that because the firearm penalty arose out of federal law, it 
was a collateral consequence and was not indicative of the Nevada 
legislature’s perspective that the offense was serious.220 
In Andersen, the court identified that the difference between the present 
case and Amezcua was the Nevada legislature’s intervening decision to 
amend the statute prohibiting specific groups from possessing firearms to 
cover anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.221  
The court found that the legislature’s action demonstrated that it perceived 
misdemeanor domestic battery to be a serious offense, triggering the 
accused’s right to a jury trial.222 
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The Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision has disrupted the state’s criminal 
justice system.223  Following Andersen, the Las Vegas city council passed a 
law creating a domestic violence criminal offense that does not restrict those 
convicted of domestic violence from possessing firearms.224  The city 
enacted this new provision because, due to the lack of resources, it was 
unable to conduct jury trials for domestic violence misdemeanors.225  Since 
Andersen, Nevada courts have charged domestic abusers with simple battery 
and other offenses that do not trigger the defendant’s jury trial right.226  As a 
result, these individuals can lawfully possess guns, while their victims are 
not protected by federal or state firearm prohibitions.227 
3.  Incorporating Collateral Consequences Would Require Jury Trials for 
Domestic Violence Misdemeanants 
Some scholars argue that collateral consequences, including gun 
prohibitions, function as additional forms of punishment that criminal 
procedure fails to consider.228  Professor Paul T. Crane argues that collateral 
consequences should be incorporated into criminal procedure.229  Crane 
developed a framework to consistently incorporate collateral 
consequences.230  In developing his framework, Crane focuses on four 
collateral consequences:  deportation, sex offender registration, firearm 
prohibitions, and disqualification of public benefits.231  Crane applies the 
Blanton analysis to determine whether a collateral consequence triggers the 
right to a jury trial.232 
Crane’s multistep framework first determines that only automatically 
imposed consequences trigger a procedural right.233  Next, Crane argues that 
whether a collateral consequence triggers a procedural right depends on 
whether the consequence is as severe as the potential prison term triggering 
that right.234  To compare the severity of imprisonment to different collateral 
consequences, Crane compares the degree to which the consequence impedes 
on the individual’s constitutional liberty interest to the degree to which the 
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relevant prison term infringes on an individual’s liberty interest.235  Crane 
also argues that when considering the jury trial right, collateral consequences 
imposed by a different sovereign from the one prosecuting the offense should 
not be considered because they do not reflect the intent or perspective of the 
legislature that enacted the law under which the defendant is being 
prosecuted.236 
Applying this framework to firearm prohibitions, Crane determines that 
prohibitions permanently restricting firearm possession are equivalent to a 
prison term ranging from one day to six months.237  Under Crane’s 
framework, firearm prohibitions are less severe than deportation and sex 
offender registration requirements but more severe than disqualification of 
public benefits.238  Crane finds that permanent firearm prohibitions, “viewed 
in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration,” should 
trigger the accused’s jury trial right under the Sixth Amendment.239  
However, Crane qualifies his finding and states that, in a case where the 
accused does not face any potential prison term, the permanent firearm 
prohibition should not trigger the jury trial right.240 
While scholars and courts alike have found that firearm prohibitions are 
sufficiently severe to overcome the presumption that an offense is petty and 
to guarantee the right to a jury trial, a majority of state and federal courts 
have found the opposite. 
B.  Firearm Prohibitions Do Not Trigger Misdemeanants’ Right to a Jury 
Trial 
Over the past two decades, following the passage of § 922(g)(9) and 
similar state laws, a majority of federal and state courts that have considered 
whether the accused is guaranteed the right to a jury trial where a 
misdemeanor conviction will result in a permanent restriction of the 
defendant’s Second Amendment right have found that there is no guaranteed 
right to a jury trial in such cases.241  This part analyzes those decisions and 
the issue of collateral consequences and criminal procedure. 
1.  Section 922(g)(9) Does Not Upgrade a Presumptively Petty Offense 
In United States v. Chavez,242 the Eleventh Circuit held that the accused’s 
jury trial right was not triggered when he was permanently prohibited from 
possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(9) as a result of his misdemeanor assault 
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conviction.243  Zoilo Chavez was convicted of misdemeanor assault under 
federal law for assaulting his wife.244  The Eleventh Circuit found that 
Chavez was not guaranteed the right to a jury trial because misdemeanor 
assault was a petty offense and Chavez had not established that Congress 
deemed the offense to be serious when it added the firearm prohibition.245  
Specifically, the court reasoned that because the language in 18 U.S.C. § 921 
acknowledges that those subject to § 922(g)(9) includes misdemeanants who 
may not be entitled to a jury trial, the court found that Congress did not intend 
for the provision to upgrade relevant underlying petty offenses under the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial analysis.246 
In 2005, the District of Nebraska was faced with the same question in 
United States v. Combs.247  Richard Combs was charged with misdemeanor 
domestic battery.248  Combs was convicted and sentenced to two days in jail 
and six months of probation; however, he faced a maximum prison term of 
six months and was subjected to § 922(g)(9).249  Combs argued that the 
lifetime firearm prohibition upgraded the petty offense to a serious offense 
and thus guaranteed his right to a jury trial.250  The district court held that the 
permanent firearm prohibition did not upgrade the petty offense and found 
that Combs was not guaranteed the right to a jury trial.251  The court held that 
there was no evidence that Combs required a gun for any specific, legal 
purpose.252 
Two district courts answered this question after the Supreme Court ruled 
in Heller.  Both courts found that the accused was not guaranteed the right to 
a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.  In United States v. Jardee,253 a 
North Dakota federal district court found that the federal firearm prohibition 
neither upgraded the otherwise petty offense to a serious offense nor 
triggered the accused’s Sixth Amendment jury trial right.254  The court, 
relying on the Supreme Court’s jury trial precedent, recognized that the 
maximum potential prison term was the most important factor to consider 
and that the firearm prohibition was a collateral consequence.255  The court 
found, however, that analyzing the lifetime firearm prohibition under the 
Supreme Court’s analysis required examining whether the penalty resulted 
in a severe deprivation of liberty, comparable to the deprivation resulting 
from a prison term of more than six months.256  The court held that while the 
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firearm prohibition infringed on Jardee’s rights, it did not infringe on his 
rights to the degree necessary to upgrade the offense to a serious offense.257  
The court also reasoned that when Congress added the relevant provision, it 
was aware that misdemeanants subject to § 922(g)(9) may not have been 
guaranteed the right to a jury trial in the underlying state or federal 
prosecution.258 
Similarly, in United States v. Snow,259 the Oregon federal district court 
found that Brian Gene Snow, who was charged with assault qualifying as a 
domestic violence misdemeanor and subject to § 922(g)(9), was not entitled 
to a jury trial because the crime was a petty offense and Snow had not 
demonstrated that the firearms prohibition turned the presumptively petty 
offense into a serious one.260  The court explained, relying on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Blanton, that the presumption was a high bar to overcome 
because it rested on the liberty interest lost from a six-month prison term, 
which is “‘intrinsically different’ from any other penalty.”261 
Very few state supreme courts have confronted this issue, and of those that 
have, most have found that a domestic violence misdemeanant is not 
guaranteed the right to a jury trial.262  Both the Supreme Court of Arizona 
and the Court of Appeals of Kansas have found that the accused, charged 
with a domestic violence misdemeanor, is not guaranteed a jury trial when, 
if convicted, they will be permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm 
under § 922(g)(9).263  The Court of Appeals of Kansas focused on legislative 
intent and reasoned that the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession was 
irrelevant to the Kansas legislature’s intent or perspective.264  The court held 
that only the state legislature’s intent should be taken into account when 
considering the seriousness of an offense for the Sixth Amendment jury right 
analysis.265  The court also noted that the Supreme Court had never found 
that a noncarceral penalty upgraded a presumptively petty offense to a serious 
one.266 
The Supreme Court of Arizona reached the same conclusion and held that 
the defendant, convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, and subject to 
§ 922(g)(9), was not guaranteed the right to a jury trial.267  The court stated 
that the maximum potential punishment imposed by the legislature 
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prosecuting the crime determined whether an offense was petty or serious.268  
The court explained that it was not feasible for the state court to account for 
every potential federal consequence or penalty a defendant faces when 
prosecuted under state law.269  The following section introduces a petition to 
the Supreme Court that asked the Court to consider whether firearm 
prohibitions are serious penalties that trigger the right to a jury trial. 
2.  Zoie H.:  Nebraska Declines to Follow Nevada Precedent 
In October 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to the petition, 
Zoie H. v. Nebraska,270 wherein the petitioner asked the Court to consider 
whether firearm prohibitions were serious penalties triggering the right to a 
jury trial.271  The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court of Nebraska erred 
when it upheld the decision by a judge, in a juvenile proceeding, denying the 
juvenile a jury trial where the juvenile would be prohibited from possessing 
a firearm until she turned twenty-five.272  The case dealt with the application 
of a newly enacted state statute extending a firearm prohibition to cover 
juvenile offenders.273  The lower court denied the juvenile’s request for a 
jury trial, reasoning that Nebraska requires juvenile proceedings to occur 
before a judge and not a jury.274  The Supreme Court of Nebraska 
affirmed.275  The court stated that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right did 
not apply to the juvenile because the firearms prohibition was not a penalty 
but a collateral consequence.276  In the petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the petitioner argued that the firearm prohibition, which “directly and 
automatically” deprived the juvenile of her right to bear arms until she turned 
twenty-five, upgraded the juvenile offense to a serious offense, triggering the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial right.277 
The petitioner relied extensively on the Supreme Court of Nevada’s 
Andersen278 decision and argued that Andersen was consistent with the 
Court’s Second Amendment precedent, while the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska’s decision was inconsistent with such precedent.279  The petitioners 
further argued that because the Court had held in Heller280 and McDonald281 
that the right protected by the Second Amendment is an individual and 
fundamental right, to deprive an individual of that fundamental constitutional 
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right, the accused must have the protections of the Constitution that are 
guaranteed for serious criminal proceedings, specifically the right to a jury 
trial.282 
The respondent argued that the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s decision was 
correct because the prohibition was intended to act as a public safety 
regulation, not as a punishment, and thus because it was not punitive, it was 
not an additional penalty.283  The respondent also stated that because the 
legislature did not authorize any period of incarceration for the juvenile 
adjudication, the offense was not serious because the applicable test, which 
analyzes the civil penalty together with the maximum potential prison term, 
was inapplicable where there was no potential term of imprisonment attached 
to the offense.284  The respondent also emphasized that the prohibition as 
applied to juveniles was temporary.285  The Supreme Court denied the 
petitioner’s writ of certiorari in October 2020 and thus declined to hear the 
case.286  The following section discusses the difficulties of classifying and 
incorporating collateral consequences. 
3.  Keeping Collateral Consequences Collateral 
In response to scholars’ calls to incorporate collateral consequences and 
abolish the direct-collateral dichotomy,287 Professor Sandra Mayson argues 
that collateral consequences should be analyzed separately.288  Mayson 
argues that because most collateral consequences focus on reducing future 
risk and are thus part of the preventive state, they are not punishment, which 
is inherently tied to culpability and blame.289  Unlike punishment, which 
seeks to assign punitive sentences commensurate with an individual’s 
conduct, preventive restraints employ cost-benefit analysis of the risk of 
future harm—the security interest—and the liberty deprivation caused by the 
measure.290 
Mayson theorizes that distinguishing collateral consequences from 
punishment encourages more thorough consideration of collateral 
consequences and of their purpose, legitimacy, and constitutionality.291  
Recognizing the important societal role preventive restraints play, as well as 
the harmful effects collateral consequences can have, Mayson argues that 
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proper oversight of such restrictions is important to protect individual liberty, 
enhance public safety, and guard against the proliferation of unconstitutional 
or unnecessary collateral consequences.292 
Mayson does not claim to establish a formal test to determine whether a 
collateral consequence is a preventive measure; however, she argues the 
purported purpose for which the restriction was authorized is instructive.293  
Specifically, whether a collateral consequence was enacted to punish 
culpable conduct or to prevent future harm distinguishes punishment from 
preventive restrictions.294  Mayson suggests that collateral consequences fall 
along a spectrum from purely preventive to purely retributive.295  Mayson 
proposes that often probation or parole would fall in the middle of the 
spectrum and argues that most collateral consequences, focused on potential 
future risks, should be designated as preventive restraints.296  Moreover, 
Mayson argues that the degree to which preventive restraints infringe on 
individual liberty must be proportional to the perceived risk.297 
Under this framework, Mayson contends that collateral consequences 
should be afforded procedural guarantees, considered in sentencing, and 
scrutinized to dispose of any unconstitutional provisions.298  Mayson 
proposes that the severity of the consequence, not its purpose for punishment 
or prevention, should determine procedural guarantees.299  And, Mayson 
argues that applicable collateral consequences, while not punishment, should 
be considered by judges when imposing a sentence, to give effect to the 
purposes of deterrence and rehabilitation.300  Lastly, Mayson asserts that 
collateral consequences should not be afforded the presumption of 
constitutionality and instead should be scrutinized to determine whether such 
provisions require the disparate treatment of convicted persons.301  Mayson 
asserts that such analysis calls for a heightened degree of scrutiny and that 
only those restrictions that are narrowly applied—in scope, form, and 
duration—would survive such review.302  Mayson also argues that collateral 
consequences should not be applied categorically—but should instead be 
reviewed on an individual basis, considering liberty interests, risks, and 
safety concerns at issue—and should be imposed through separate civil 
proceedings.303 
While Professor Mayson does not speak specifically to firearm 
prohibitions applying to domestic violence misdemeanants, she does 
characterize firearm prohibitions generally as falling at the preventive end of 
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the punishment-prevention spectrum.304  Felon firearm prohibitions are 
enacted to prevent gun crimes and are concerned with future harm and, thus, 
future risk.305 
III.  FOLLOWING LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND FOCUSING ON VICTIM SAFETY 
This part is divided into two sections.  Part III.A argues that courts, 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, should find that an individual, who 
has been charged with misdemeanor domestic violence and who may thus be 
permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm, is not guaranteed the right 
to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment because such prohibitions do not 
infringe on the individual’s liberty to the degree a prison term of more than 
six months does.  While the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari when 
presented with a similar question, the issue may continue to emerge in state 
or federal courts.  Part III.B sets forth recommendations for Congress, state 
legislatures, and domestic violence advocates to improve domestic violence 
victims’ safety.  These recommendations focus on enforcing and expanding 
firearm prohibitions, specifically those stemming from civil protective 
orders. 
A.  Applying Blanton and Incorporating Firearm Prohibitions 
This section considers the issue set forth in Part II by revisiting Supreme 
Court precedent and applying Professor Crane’s306 framework of 
incorporating collateral consequences to consider whether a domestic 
violence misdemeanant is guaranteed the right to a jury trial.  This Note 
follows the approach taken by the majority of courts and argues that courts 
should find that permanent firearm prohibitions do not upgrade petty 
misdemeanor domestic violence offenses to serious offenses so as to 
guarantee misdemeanants the right to a jury trial. 
This Note argues that, first, collateral consequences should be scrutinized 
and rejected if they are unconstitutional and, second, constitutional collateral 
consequences should be factored into criminal procedure to determine 
whether such additional restrictions infringe on the accused’s liberty to such 
a degree as to require additional procedural protections.  This Note argues, 
based on Supreme Court and lower court precedent, that § 922(g)(9) is 
constitutional under intermediate or strict scrutiny307 and that misdemeanor 
domestic violence firearm prohibitions can be presumed constitutional under 
Professor Mayson’s analysis.308 
While Professor Mayson argues that collateral consequences should be 
analyzed separately from direct consequences, she also contends that 
criminal procedure should account for the severity of deprivation of liberty 
imposed by restrictions, regardless of their purpose as punitive or 
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preventive.309  As set forth by the Supreme Court, this analysis requires 
comparing collateral and direct penalties.310  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has demonstrated a willingness to dissolve the collateral-direct distinction.311  
Thus, this Note applies Supreme Court precedent to determine whether 
permanent firearm prohibitions upgrade petty offenses and trigger the jury 
trial right. 
In Blanton, the Supreme Court determined that the severity of the penalty 
imposed by the legislature is indicative of the legislature’s determination that 
the offense is serious.312  Firearm prohibitions—and other collateral 
consequences—are imposed by both the federal and state legislatures.313  
Thus, when considering whether the jury trial right is guaranteed, it is 
consequential whether the same sovereign is prosecuting the offense and 
implementing the collateral consequence.314  This issue is highlighted by the 
Supreme Court of Nevada’s decisions in Andersen and Amezcua.315  In 
Andersen and Amezcua, the defendants were convicted of misdemeanor 
crimes of domestic violence and as a result were prohibited from possessing 
firearms.316  While the penalties were nearly identical, the disparate 
outcomes depended on the sovereign imposing the penalty.317 
The Andersen and Amezcua decisions likely demonstrate the appropriate 
approach to legislative intent.  The Court expounded this approach in Duncan 
when it recognized that courts should look to the “penalty authorized by the 
law of the locality” to assess the severity of an offense.318  While this 
approach undoubtedly appears futile or arbitrary from the perspective of the 
accused, whose concern is the liberty lost, it would be problematic to confuse 
or intertwine the intent of distinct sovereigns.  First, to do so would trigger 
issues of federalism because it would blur the line between the separate 
sovereigns of the state and federal governments and would be contrary to the 
practice of applying legislative intent.  Second, failure to separate the 
sovereigns would result in the immense task of upending state and federal 
criminal procedure to account for the thousands of federal and state laws that 
affect defendants regardless of whether they are prosecuted by the federal or 
state government.319 
The next consideration is the liberty interest at stake.  In Baldwin, the Court 
focused on distinguishing severe from petty penalties by examining the 
severity of the penalty, namely the length of the prison term.320  The Court’s 
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analysis centered on the deprivation of liberty resulting from a prison term of 
more than six months.321  In Blanton, the Court held that if a collateral 
consequence was so severe that it demonstrated that the legislature 
considered the offense to be serious, it would upgrade the otherwise petty 
offense to a serious one if the additional penalty “approximate[d] in severity 
the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.”322  The Court emphasized the 
unique severity of a prison term of more than six months and explained how 
this loss of liberty was distinct from other penalties that infringe on other 
freedoms.323 
Based on this precedent, a constitutional test determining whether a 
collateral consequence upgrades an otherwise petty offense to a serious 
offense should consider whether the additional penalty or consequence is a 
proxy for confinement or a restriction on the liberty interests that 
imprisonment infringes.324  As set forth by Professor Crane, to upgrade the 
offense, the penalty must encroach on the liberty interest to a degree 
comparable to the degree a prison term of more than six months would.325 
The argument that domestic violence misdemeanants should be guaranteed 
the right to a jury trial has rested on the Heller and McDonald decisions, 
which deemed the Second Amendment right to gun ownership to be 
individual and fundamental.326  Thus, a permanent firearm prohibition is 
such a severe restriction that it reflects the legislature’s determination that the 
offense is serious.327  However, the Court has not determined that the right 
to a jury trial applies when the right that is infringed is fundamental but 
whether the interest restricted is that liberty interest that is infringed by a 
prison term of more than six months.328  In Duncan, the Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial right was a fundamental right.329  However, the 
Court did not adopt the reasoning that the jury trial right was automatically 
triggered when a fundamental right was restricted.330  Arguably, the opposite 
is true.  The Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to mean that the 
accused is not always guaranteed the right to a jury trial.331  Instead, when a 
criminal prosecution begins and the accused’s liberty is potentially infringed, 
one or more of the accused’s Sixth Amendment rights are triggered.332  The 
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right that is triggered depends on the degree to which the accused’s liberty 
interest is restricted.333 
Additionally, as Professor Crane notes, other penalties actually infringe on 
one’s relevant liberty interest to a greater degree than firearms prohibitions 
do.334  Deportation, like imprisonment, results in the physical removal of 
individuals from their families, communities, and work.335  Sex offender 
registration requirements can restrict where individuals can live, at times 
removing them from their families and communities or requiring that the 
individuals be monitored by GPS.336  By contrast, while permanent firearms 
prohibitions infringe on an individual’s Second Amendment right, they 
infringe on one’s relevant liberty interest—that which is restricted when an 
individual serves more than six months in prison—to a lesser degree than 
deportation or sex offender registration do.337 
Moreover, Congress intended for § 922(g)(9) to apply to misdemeanants 
who may not have had the right to a jury trial.338  As the Eleventh Circuit 
determined in United States v. Chavez, the language in 18 U.S.C. § 921 
specifically recognizes that individuals subject to § 922(g)(9) includes 
misdemeanants who were not entitled to a jury trial in the underlying 
offense.339  Thus, Congress authorized the provision’s application to 
individuals who were not guaranteed the right to a jury trial and did not intend 
for the provision to upgrade such offenses to serious offenses requiring jury 
trials.340 
One could argue that § 922(g)(9) was enacted before the Court explicitly 
held that the Second Amendment right is individual and fundamental and, 
thus, the provision is no longer consistent with this interpretation of the 
Second Amendment.  However, as this part discussed, precedent does not 
focus on whether the right infringed is fundamental but rather whether the 
right infringed is commensurate with the liberty interest infringed by a prison 
term longer than six months. 
Professor Crane argued that permanent firearm prohibitions, taken 
together with the maximum authorized prison term, trigger the right to a jury 
trial under the Sixth Amendment.341  This Note argues that the opposite is 
true—that firearm prohibitions do not upgrade an otherwise petty offense—
because the firearm prohibition, taken together with the maximum six-month 
prison term, does not result in an individual’s relevant liberty interests being 
infringed to a degree comparable to the infringement resulting from a prison 
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term of more than six months.  This Note reaches this conclusion on two 
grounds.  First, the Court’s precedent established a high bar for a collateral 
consequence to upgrade an otherwise petty offense, which the firearm 
prohibitions do not meet.  And, the Court has never held that an additional 
penalty overcomes the presumption of pettiness.342  Second, Congress 
explicitly intended for the firearm prohibition to apply regardless of the 
accused’s right to a jury trial in the underlying offense.343  There was no 
intent for the provision to upgrade the underlying offenses. 
While state statutes may not be as explicit as the federal law, the above 
analysis applies equally.  The Court’s test looks to whether the liberty interest 
infringed is comparable to a prison term of more than six months.  Though 
the intent of each state legislature should be considered, this Note argues that 
such intent should be explicit so as to override the analysis set forth above.  
Absent such intent, under the Court’s test, such a prohibition does not 
upgrade a petty offense. 
Whether or not domestic violence misdemeanants have the right to a jury 
trial may affect victim safety.344  Application and enforcement of firearm 
prohibitions are also vital to domestic violence victims’ safety from gun 
violence.  The next section focuses on recommendations for advocates and 
legislatures to enhance the safety of domestic violence victims with regard to 
gun violence. 
B.  Enforcing and Expanding Gun Laws to Improve Victim Safety 
This Note proposes that legislatures and domestic violence advocates 
should focus on expanding and enforcing legislation that prohibits access to 
firearms by those subject to civil protective orders.345  Civil protective orders 
are more immediate than criminal convictions, are controlled by the victim, 
and are immune from the challenge discussed in this Note.346 
Under federal law, individuals subject to civil protective orders are 
prohibited from possessing a firearm.347  A majority of states also have laws 
that prohibit an individual, who is subject to a domestic violence restraining 
order, from possessing a firearm.348  These protective orders are ordered by 
a family or civil court, and the firearm prohibition is often limited in time to 
the duration of the order.349  Thus, these provisions are shielded from the 
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challenge discussed in this Note.350  Because these are civil orders, the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right, which applies in criminal prosecutions, is 
inapplicable.  In addition, while firearm prohibitions for domestic violence 
misdemeanants are often permanent and thus infringe individual liberty 
more, firearm prohibitions stemming from civil orders of protection are 
confined to the period of the protective order.351  These laws also prove to be 
effective:  states with these laws report a reduction in domestic violence 
homicides.352 
While most states have enacted laws that restrict domestic violence 
misdemeanants and abusers subject to civil protective orders from possessing 
firearms, enforcement of these laws is lacking.  Only sixteen states require 
the relinquishment of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants or 
abusers subject to restraining orders.353  This Note recommends that 
advocates and legislatures focus on enforcement of firearm relinquishment 
for misdemeanants and abusers who are subject to protective orders.  
Enforcement of such laws has had positive results on reducing domestic 
violence homicides.354 
In 2003, the sheriff in King County, Washington, established a domestic 
violence firearm enforcement unit that enforces firearm relinquishment and 
forfeiture by individuals who are subject to domestic violence protective 
orders.355  In 2018, the number of firearms forfeited to the unit was four times 
the number forfeited in 2016.356  The program’s success is also reflected in 
rearrest statistics.  In 2006, of individuals who were rearrested after their 
firearms were removed, 15 percent were arrested for domestic violence 
charges and 20 percent for other crimes, but none of these individuals were 
arrested for firearm possession.357 
Amending legislation and establishing task forces nationwide at the county 
level to work with sheriff’s offices, judges, and prosecutors to ensure that 
domestic abusers forfeit their firearms would result in fewer firearms in the 
hands of abusers.  These task forces should focus on enforcement of gun 
prohibitions stemming from both domestic violence civil orders of protection 
and from misdemeanor convictions. 
The focus on enforcement and the relinquishment of firearms by domestic 
abusers should also be extended to ex parte orders of protection.  When 
individuals petition a civil or family court for a civil order of protection, they 
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are often granted a temporary order or ex parte order.358  The temporary order 
remains in place until a hearing, following notice to the respondent, at which 
point the court decides whether to extend the order or issue a final order of 
protection.359  The federal firearm prohibition provision only applies after 
this final order is issued.360  However, evidence shows that the most 
dangerous time for domestic violence victims is the short period of time after 
they leave their abusers.361  As such, twenty-two states have passed laws that 
prohibit individuals subject to ex parte protection orders from possessing a 
firearm.362  This Note encourages legislatures and advocates to focus on 
passing ex parte provisions in states that do not have them, to lobby for an 
amendment to the federal law to apply to ex parte orders, and to establish and 
expand task forces that will enforce firearm prohibitions and require the 
relinquishment of firearms temporarily.  While this Note is mindful that such 
laws are vulnerable to constitutional due process challenges that argue that 
restricting an individual’s Second Amendment right without notice or a 
hearing is unconstitutional, there are strong arguments to the alternative.  
Other federal provisions permit firearm restrictions prior to or without a 
criminal conviction, including provisions that prohibit firearm possession by 
those subject to a felony indictment363 and by drug users.364 
Challenges to domestic violence misdemeanor firearm prohibitions focus 
on the permanence of such prohibitions.  As such, advocates and state 
legislatures might choose to pass or amend legislation that prohibits firearm 
possession for domestic violence misdemeanants for a limited period of time.  
While this approach would not prohibit firearm possession indefinitely, it 
would prohibit the possession in the period following the initial separation 
between the abuser and the victim, which is often the most dangerous time.365 
Finally, judges, attorneys, and law enforcement presiding over or 
practicing in family, civil, and criminal courts should receive training and 
education about the compounding dangers that result when domestic abusers 
have access to firearms.  Increased training and education would likely lead 
to judges, lawyers, and law enforcement taking victims’ fears and concerns 
seriously and would likely increase safety through the application and 
enforcement of firearm prohibitions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note argues that, consistent with the Supreme Court’s Sixth 
Amendment jury trial precedent, domestic violence misdemeanants 
convicted of petty misdemeanor offenses and subject to permanent firearm 
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prohibitions are not guaranteed the right to a jury trial.  The Court’s analysis 
looks at whether the liberty interest infringed by a noncarceral punishment is 
equivalent or comparable to the degree an individual’s liberty is infringed on 
by a prison term of more than six months.  While permanent firearm 
prohibitions undoubtedly infringe on an individual’s liberty, they do not do 
so in the form or degree that a prison term of more than six months does.  As 
such, courts should find, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, that 
firearm prohibitions do not upgrade presumptively petty offenses to 
guarantee domestic violence misdemeanants the right to a jury trial. 
Moreover, despite frequent challenges to firearm prohibitions and in light 
of the ongoing danger guns present to victims of domestic violence and 
society more generally, state and federal firearm legislation has been enacted 
to reduce future violence.  However, enforcement of firearm prohibitions is 
lacking.  Increasing enforcement and requiring abusers to relinquish firearms 
in criminal and civil procedures would reduce access to guns by those this 
proposed solution seeks to prohibit from possessing the guns.  These 
measures have and likely will continue to provide greater safety for victims. 
